The Governance of Overlapping Jurisdictions.
INTRODUCTION 1
International legalization, rather than substituting international for national law, creates a multiplicity of legal orders. As a result, conflicts of overlapping jurisdictions may occur vertically, between national and international law, as well as horizontally, between different national legal orders. The latter type of horizontal overlap is prominent in competition control where international legalization is characterized only marginally by the emergence of new international rules, but by an expanding reach of already existing national and European law beyond traditional territorial borders.
A number of high profile conflicts of horizontally overlapping jurisdictions between US and EU competition authorities have attracted intense scholarly interest during the past decade -e.g. the merger cases GE/Honeywell and Boeing/McDonnell-Douglas or the antitrust investigations against Microsoft (cf. Damro 2001; Chun 2002; Morgan and McGuire 2004; Grant and Neven 2005; Fox 2007 ). Most prominently, the emergence of conflicts is explained by different traditions of competition policy and divergent industrial policy goals. Given these differences and the broad jurisdiction of both US and EU competition authorities, however, we should be much more astonished that there are so few conflicts. Typically, transgovernmental networks that exchange information, cooperate in enforcement and prepare regulatory convergence are referred to in order to explain how conflicts are moderated or prevented (Friedberg 1990; Devuyst 2001; Raustiala 2002; Mehta 2003; Slaughter 2004: 174f.; Damro 2006b ). Yet these explanations tend to neglect the political implications of international cooperation between competition authorities and their governance of overlapping jurisdictions.
International cooperation, this paper argues, significantly enhances the autonomy of EU and US competition authorities. If cooperation fails and competition authorities clash over individual cases, they become susceptible to external influence. Then, governments may try to intervene; firms can choose forums; and judges get the ultimate say in cases of conflict. By contrast, transgovernmental networking makes competition authorities institutionally more independent and allows them to privilege more clearly undistorted competition over other policy goals.
The argument will be developed in four steps: First, the general challenge of overlapping jurisdictions is described and the political implications of different strategies to 1 I would like to thank Markus Krajewski, Tilman Krüger, Susanne K. Schmidt and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on this paper. deal with overlapping jurisdictions are emphasized. Subsequently, the field of competition policy is introduced and existing explanations of conflicts and cooperation between US and EU authorities are discussed. The main argument on the autonomy of competition authorities vis-à-vis politicians, judges and firms is elaborated in the following chapter. The conclusion summarizes the main findings of the paper and outlines routes for further research.
THE GOVERNANCE OF OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONS
International legalization loosens the traditional link between territory and law (Raustiala 2006) . While nation states are still defined along territorial borders, law is increasingly international or regional (e.g. European). International and European law hardly ever replace domestic law, but they add additional legal layers which overlap and, therefore, potentially conflict with domestic law (Zürn and Leibfried 2005: 21f.) .
Moreover, the rise of global and regional transborder activities also involves an increased interpenetration of domestic and foreign legal orders.
We may, thus, distinguish two basic types of overlapping jurisdictions that may lead to conflicts between legal orders. Vertical conflicts arise between different levels of jurisdiction, i.e. between domestic, regional and international law. Horizontal conflicts emerge between different domestic legal orders. Going beyond this distinction, some authors note that vertical conflicts may also involve controversies across legal sectorse.g. if international trade law clashes with domestic environmental regulation -and, therefore, propose to speak of diagonal conflicts (Joerges 2007: 8) . Furthermore, horizontal conflicts can also occur on a purely international level, i.e. between different international regimes (Fischer-Lescano and Teubner 2004) . positive comity, a governmental agency rather than enforcing its own law extraterritorially may request a foreign agency to get active on its behalf (Slaughter 2004: 250-253) .
The questions of how to solve or to prevent conflicts between overlapping jurisdictions are of fundamental importance for any political system as they touch upon the basic distribution of regulatory competences. However, these issues are mostly debated by legal scholars or economists, while political science often remains silent. The 'constitutionalization' of European law, for example, has mainly been an invention of European lawyers (Weiler 1991) , and the principle of mutual recognition is often overlooked in contributions about European governance (Schmidt 2007) . Debates on the 'pluralism' or the 'fragmentation' of international law are largely confined to legal circles (cf. Walker
2008; Koskenniemi and Leino 2002). Scholars of law and economics treat issues of
overlapping jurisdictions mainly as a matter of (in)efficient allocation of competences and, therefore, ask for ways to reduce transaction costs and try to identify the optimum regulatory level (Trachtman 2001; Budzinski 2008) . In contrast, a political science approach needs to ask for the actors that have an interest in a particular strategy to deal with overlapping jurisdictions and for the implications of this strategy concerning the policy goals at issue as well as regards the distribution of competences (cf. Budzinski and Christiansen 2005) .
OVERLAPPING JURISDICTIONS IN COMPETITION CONTROL
Competition control lends itself to investigate overlapping jurisdictions probably better than any other policy field. As the next subsection will show, we find a long history and a great variety of horizontal, vertical and diagonal overlaps between different jurisdictions in competition control. At the same time, we only find a surprisingly low number of conflicts emerging from these overlaps. As will be shown subsequently, existing explanations do not sufficiently account for the political implications of this observation.
Conflicts about extraterritorial competition control
In the field of competition policy, we can observe all of the different types of judicial overlap described above. Within the EU, competition control is hierarchically organized. The European Commission is the central authority in a system of largely decentralized competition enforcement through national competition agencies (Wilks 2005) .
Beyond the European context, no comparable system of international competition con- (Bourgeois and Demaret 1995) and may thus trigger sectoral or 'diagonal' conflicts. In the following, the paper focuses on global competition control and, therefore, excludes intra-European conflicts between jurisdictions.
Given that no global regime has been established so far, the history of international competition control is mainly one of extraterritorial application of US and, more re- 2002: 74) . Undoubtedly, there is potential for conflicts of horizontally overlapping jurisdictions and during the past decades several high profile conflicts between US and EU authorities emerged, mainly in the field of merger control (see Table 2 ). All of the listed conflicts have attracted intense public and scientific attention. Obviously, most of these cases were politically highly salient and some of them led to landmark decisions in terms of legal doctrine -but are they typical and, thus, do they constitute good examples to understand more generally the governance of overlapping jurisdictions in international competition control?
Some authors argue that, in fact, these cases are 'atypical' (Devuyst 2001: 142f.) and result from 'flaws' in economic analysis and bilateral cooperation (Damro and Guay 2009 ). In Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, for example, competition authorities still lacked the necessary experience in transatlantic cooperation and, therefore, rather than seeking early and informal consultations, US authorities mistakenly tried to increase public pressure on the European Commission (ibid.: 19). Moreover, it took very long for Boeing to realize that it could not simply ignore the Commission's demands without risking the prohibition of the merger; as such, Boeing's behaviour contributed to an aggravation of the conflict (Devuyst 2001: 144) . Similarly, General Electric publicly pressured the European Commission for a quick decision which made transatlantic cooperation difficult and turned out to be counterproductive to the firms' interest (Damro and Guay 2009: 29f.) . Also, Damro (2001) has put forward an explanation of transatlantic conflict, which emphasizes the political-strategic considerations of the European Commission. By exercising extraterritorial competition control against strong US businesses, the Commission could "enhance its credibility in the eyes of the member states" as well as "in the eyes of non-Union third parties" (ibid. 217). Yet, this strategy of conflict was
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-7 -only possible due to the very particular features of the case in which both, the US government and Boeing had a strong interest in compromising with the Commission and to ensure a quick positive decision (ibid. 218).
In contrast, other authors regard the conflicts mentioned to indicate more systemic "transatlantic divergence" (Morgan and McGuire 2004) . First, US and EU competition authorities are seen to traditionally differ on their policy goals: "We protect competition, you protect competitors" (Fox 2003) . According to this criticism, EU competition control is overly strict in cases of market concentration and tends to neglect efficiency gains and pro-competitive effects resulting from economies of scale (Chun 2002: 65; Fox 2003: 160; Niels and ten Kate 2004: 12) . Secondly, and linked to the first argument, EU competition control is (or was) said to lack appropriate economic analysis (Morgan and McGuire 2004: 45-50 
Cooperation and convergence
If the latter set of explanations on systematically divergent competition approaches and on the lack of international harmonization was right, however, we should rather be surprised of the low number of conflicts between US and EU competition authorities (cf. cases under investigation (see Table 3 ). thermore, it establishes regular contacts for the exchange of non-confidential information (Article III) and it strengthens enforcement cooperation and coordination (Article IV). The 1991 agreement explicitly refers to 'negative comity', i.e. to taking into account the 'important interests' of the other party when investigating or deciding a particular case (Article IV), but it also implicitly establishes a possibility for positive comity, as one party may request the other to investigate a particular case and to enforce competition (Article V).
The latter principle has been regulated in more detail in the 1998 EU/US Positive Comity Agreement (Devuyst 2001: 136 "Distilling and disseminating credible information" (ibid.: 177), i.e. exchange of information between agencies helps to "avoid unnecessary duplication of work and costs, both for the competition authorities involved and for the businesses whose conduct is subject to review" (Devuyst 2001: 132) . Moreover, if firms under investigation are seated abroad, competition authorities crucially depend on information collected by their foreign counterparts. As a premise, confidential business information is excluded from information exchange -but, in order to facilitate swift investigations and to lower transaction costs, businesses may choose to partly waive their confidentiality rights and to allow different competition authorities access to information that has been submitted to one of them (Parisi 1999: 138f.) . "Improving compliance" is another virtue that Slaughter (2004: 183) US and EU competition authorities, therefore, has to be seen as a reaction to economic internationalization in order to ensure enforcement of competition rules (Damro 2006b ).
Moreover, by synchronizing their investigations and by reaching congruent decisions, competition authorities increase the predictability of competition control and make compliance with demands from different jurisdictions easier (Devuyst 2001: 132) .
Finally, network cooperation in individual competition cases may help to create "convergence and informed divergence" (Slaughter 2004: 171) . In the short run, of course, "voluntary cooperation does not immediately lead to a perception by competition authorities to adopt the same or similar laws and procedures" (Wigger 2005: 13) .
Nevertheless, we can observe various signs for a convergence trend between US and EU competition control. Friedberg (1990) was one of the first to argue that US and EU visions of extraterritorial jurisdiction were approaching each other. As has already been mentioned, the EU modernization efforts since 2003, e.g. the appointment of a Chief
Competition Economist and the introduction of more refined economic analysis, were largely interpreted as a move towards established US practice (Fox 2007: 359; Röller and Buigues 2005) . The Merger Working Group's best practice guidelines are probably the most obvious example of a soft harmonization between US and EU competition regimes (Damro 2006a: 133-138) .
To summarize, the field of competition policy is not only a master example of overlapping jurisdictions -it also exhibits one of the most developed systems of international, mainly bilateral, cooperation. While cooperation in transgovernmental networks does not resolve the underlying issue of overlapping jurisdictions, it is largely successful in preventing jurisdictional conflicts between US and EU competition authorities.
Jurisdictional conflict is an exception, not the rule. Still, international competition con-trol is more than "just an exercise in the reduction of transaction costs (…) Competition law has potent historical, economic, political, and social roots that make it a market nation's ultimate form of public law" (Waller 1997: 395) . Taking this reminder seriously, the next section discusses the political implications of transatlantic competition cooperation.
AUTONOMY THROUGH COMPETITION POLICY COOPERATION
The rise of networks, Raustiala argues "is aided by the perception that many regulatory issues are technocratic " (2002: 24) . This perception seems to be largely reaffirmed by the above-cited accounts of transgovernmental cooperation between US and EU competition authorities. Cooperation in competition control helps to overcome information deficits, to prevent duplication of work, to improve legal certainty and to gradually harmonize competition rules and practices (cf. Whytock 2005: 51).
Nevertheless, transatlantic cooperation between competition authorities is not politically neutral. In the following, it will be argued that cooperation significantly enhances the independence of competition authorities from other institutions and it increases their autonomy to pursue undistorted competition vis-à-vis other policy goals. This aspect of autonomy was essential when Keohane and Nye (1974: 42, 46f .) first wrote about transgovernmental relations and the incentives for sub-units of government to engage in transgovernmental coalitions. Accordingly, conflict prevention between EU and US competition authorities has to be interpreted also as a means to increase agency autonomy and to forestall external intervention by politicians, judges, and firms.
Autonomy from politics
EU competition control operates in a politically complex environment (cf. Cini and McGowan 2009: 150-161 Office (Wilks and McGowan 1995: 265) .
In terms of policy goals, competition policy touches upon a broad variety of other economic policies such as single market integration, industrial policy, trade policy, and regional policy (Buigues et al. 1995; Välilä 2008; Blauberger 2009: 723) . Market concentration, for example, may be desirable from an industrial policy perspective, if larger enterprises invest relatively more in research and development, but it could still be un-
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-12 -desirable in terms of free competition (Gual 1995: 19) . Conversely, strict competition control of domestic firms might be considered disadvantageous for reasons of strategic trade policy (Brander and Spencer 1985 (Damro 2006a: 100-105; 2006b) . Negotiations between the com- 16 As regards policy objectives other than competition, US competition authorities and the judges that ultimately decide are traditionally more restricted than the multi-faceted European Commission. The pursuit of policy goals beyond competition is left to the legislature: "American antitrust law is applied with a peculiar set of blinders designed to prevent the consideration of any factor outside the narrow question of whether an agreement or practice unduly restricts competition (…) The U.S. approach is premised on the preservation and enhancement of competition as the paramount and overriding goal of the antitrust laws to be applied by the courts, while an active Congress stands ready to pass subsequent specific statutes when it wishes to achieve some other result or promote a different social or policy goal. Such compartmentalization reflects basic separation of powers notions fundamental to the United States" (Waller 1994: 586f.) . US resistance against an international harmonization of antitrust rules can partly be explained by competition officials' concerns that this separation might be undermined, e.g.
through inclusion of trade issues in competition control (Waller 1997: 378f. 
-13 -and EU authorities were framed differently, i.e. as non-binding 'arrangements' or 'best practice guidelines' which did not require Council approval.
Individual cases also show the autonomy enhancing effects of cooperation between competition authorities and, vice-versa, the increase of political interventions in cases of conflict. In Worldcom/MCI in 1998, for example, the European Commission and the US DoJ tightly coordinated their investigations and were able to jointly enforce strict remedies before the merger could be executed. 19 In MCI Worldcom/Sprint in 2000, both the EU Commission and the US DoJ reached the same conclusion to prohibit the merger which would have created one of the world's largest telecoms firms. 20 The decision of the EU Commission received harsh criticism from some US senators who tried to retaliate by blocking foreign acquisitions of US telecom. Eventually, however, cooperation between competition authorities increased their autonomy from political intervention:
"Ironically, while both U.S. and European regulators agreed that the Sprint-WorldCom deal was simply too big, it's the politicians who have bridled at the merger's rejection" (Bodony and Krapf 2000) . Another telling example is the permitted takeover of Peoplesoft by Oracle (both US software companies), in which close cooperation among them led US and EU authorities to reach the same conclusion -despite theoretical and methodological differences (Vinje and Paemen 2006: 22) . 21 The EU Commission largely synchronized its own investigations with those of the US DoJ and, in its final decision, referred to evidence from the US trial. In the recent Google/Doubleclick merger, politicians and non-governmental organizations voiced strong concerns as regards privacy protection. Even the European Parliament, usually no player in competition control, discussed the question whether competition authorities should consider privacy concerns in their assessment. 22 The Commission as well as the US FTC, however, referred these broader concerns to the legislature and allowed the merger on the basis of alargely identical -pure competition analysis. 
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The few cases of conflict between EU and US competition authorities, by contrast, were characterized by high levels of politicization. While the conflicts were partly caused by political intervention, conflicting approaches of competition authorities also provided opportunity structures for further intervention. In Aérsopatiale/de Havilland, the European Commission's first merger prohibition in 1991, Commissioner Sir Leon
Brittain asserted himself against US and Canadian authorities that had previously allowed the merger, mainly for industrial policy reasons (Klodt 2001: 885) . 24 Nevertheless, the decision-making process within the Commission exhibited a deep cleavage between those advocating a strict application of European competition rules and others, foremost DG Industry as well as the French and Italian Commissioners, supporting the merger for domestic industrial policy and employment considerations (Cini and McGowan 2009: 154f.) . Although DG Comp prevailed in the individual case, the Commission's reputation for stringent competition policy was clearly damaged (Wilks and McGowan 1995) . In Boeing/McDonnell Douglas, the EU Commission threatened to prohibit the merger of two US companies that had been permitted by the US FTC in early July 1997. 25 In response, US politicians pressured the EU Commission: US President Clinton considered a WTO complaint, US Congress condemned the EU's 'unwarranted interference', and, finally, the Commission tied its merger approval to a package of remedies offered by Boeing (Damro and Guay 2009: 17f.) . While the Commission's insistence in this individual case certainly helped to establish itself as a global competition player (Damro 2001) , both US and EU competition authorities soon realized that repeated conflicts would undermine their credibility in the long run (Damro and Guay 2009: 19) . In 2001, the Commission took its first decision to block a merger of two US companies -General Electric and Honeywell -that had already been allowed by the US DoJ. 26 Once again, the Commission reaffirmed its global role, but none of the competition authorities involved remained without damage to its image. Both sides were accused of being influenced by protectionist domestic industrial interests and flawed competition analyses (Fox 2007; Klodt 2005: 54) .
To summarize, conflict prevention between EU and US competition authorities reduces the likelihood of political intervention and, thus, increases the autonomy of competition control. If conflicts cannot be prevented, however, they have to be solved and this is usually the task of judges. 
Autonomy from judges
Next to competition authorities, courts are clearly the most important players in competition control, albeit with very different functions in the US and in the EU. In the US, competition authorities investigate and enforce, but courts have the final say in establishing whether a firm's behaviour is classified as anti-competitive (Waller 1994: 588f.) .
In the EU, the Commission does not only investigate and enforce competition rules; it also takes the final decisions. These decisions can be challenged in court, but most of the time, the ECJ has been a major ally of the Commission in expanding European competition control, e.g. when it found that existing Treaty rules authorized the Commission to control mergers and, thus, paved the way for the first European merger regulation (Cini and McGowan 2009: 128-131) .
27
In many respects, therefore, competition authorities cannot be autonomous from judges and there is also no perceived need for more autonomy as courts are usually not regarded as pursuing an independent competition or industrial policy agenda. With respect to extraterritoriality, however, the jurisprudence's contribution remains largely inconclusive until today. In his very detailed study, Dlouhy (2003) 
This position is reflected in the EU-US Bilateral Agreement and Positive Comity
Agreements."
The bilateral EU and US cooperation agreements on competition use very prudent language in order to signal that they do not redefine the scope of extraterritorial jurisdiction and/or comity and, thus, that they do not challenge legislative and judicial authorities:
"Nothing in this Article limits the discretion of the notified Party under its competition laws" and "Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted in a manner inconsistent with the existing laws, or as requiring any change in the laws" of the US, the EU or its Member states. 28 Yet, by rendering questions of jurisdictional overlap and the limits of extraterritoriality less salient, they ultimately aim at increasing the autonomy of competition authorities from jurisprudence.
According to official justifications, the 1998 Agreement on Positive Comity shall reduce cases of extraterritorial competition control and, thus, could be interpreted as an attempt to substitute expansionist jurisprudence on extraterritoriality by a more deferential approach through EU and US competition authorities (Damro 2006a: 122f.) . Quite to the contrary, however, the agreement leaves the fundamental issue of jurisdiction largely untouched while practically creating new opportunities for US and EU authorities to enforce their competition laws (Dlouhy 2003: 233-235 thorities lacked enforcement capacities and 'deferral' to the EU Commission was seen as the more promising option (Baetge 2009: 383) .
To sum up, courts play an important role in competition control and the extraterritoriality of US and EU competition law was established by judges. As to the overlap of competition jurisdictions, however, jurisprudence remains inconclusive and, at least as a side-effect, the strategy of conflict prevention practiced by EU and US competition authorities diminishes the influence of the judiciary.
Autonomy from firms
Finally, competition authorities depend on close cooperation with industry, e.g. when firms provide information about ongoing or potential investigations and when remedies are negotiated in merger review (cf. Cini and McGowan 2009: 156) . Given its immense workload, the Commission has an interest in reaching consensus with the enterprises involved and in pre-empting anticompetitive behaviour from the beginning rather than fighting too many conflicts at the same time. 30 If firms publicly pressure competition authorities, however, the credibility of competition control gets undermined. each individual firm has an interest in strict control for all others and no restrictions for itself (Kerber and Budzinski 2004: 50) . Moreover, if forum shopping increases, competition authorities at least partly lose their control on the cases to deal with and on the information they receive.
Cooperation among competition authorities does not remove the need for them to also coordinate with firms, but it strengthens the authorities' role in setting the rules during this coordination process. For example, in cases in which firms are represented by different lawyers in the EU and in the US, Parisi (1999: 141) 
CONCLUSION
This article started out with a general overview on the governance of overlapping jurisdictions and introduced the more specific problem of horizontal overlap in competition control. Due to the fact that US as well as EU authorities apply their competition rules extraterritorially, significant potential for horizontal judicial overlap exists. Yet, apart from some high profile conflicts that have attracted great public interest, most competition decisions are taken separately but complementary by US and EU competition authorities. Two main insights can be derived from the case of competition control and both aspects would clearly benefit from further research, including comparison with other policy fields. Being a frontrunner in international legalization, the field of competition policy is particularly interesting for studying the governance of overlapping jurisdictions, but one has to be cautious in generalizing from this field. First, strategies of conflict prevention rather than conflict solution prevail in most cases of transatlantic judicial overlap in competition control. Given the increasing complexity of international legalization and the absence of a hierarchical system of dispute settlement (comparable e.g. to the ECJ), preventing conflicts seems to be more feasible than any attempt to clearly re-define borders between jurisdictions. Transgovernmental The argument put forward in this article builds on transgovernmentalist approaches and stresses the relevance of administrative networks in effectively preventing jurisdictional conflicts. In pointing to the political implications of network cooperation, however, it adds a more critical notion. Independence of competition authorities may improve the effectiveness of competition control, but competition is just one policy goal among others. If other policies, which are affected by competition control, do not lend themselves equally well for transgovernmental cooperation, their goals may be disadvantaged. Moreover, such an asymmetry between policy goals would not result from a deliberate political choice, but rather from the de-politicisation of potential conflicts between overlapping jurisdictions.
